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Philosophy Undergraduate Student’s Paper: “The Materialization of Morality: A Response to Sam Harris’s Scientific Basis for Ethics”

 
Antisocialdarwinist
 
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Antisocialdarwinist
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30 April 2016 13:59
 
Poldano - 29 April 2016 08:28 PM
Antisocialdarwinist - 29 April 2016 07:12 AM
Poldano - 28 April 2016 11:22 PM
Antisocialdarwinist - 28 April 2016 07:58 AM

...

Yes, I agree with all of that. But we can still distinguish between what I call tangible and intangible well-being. If I give you the shirt off my back, your tangible well-being improves at the expense of mine. The only thing that makes it worthwhile, from my perspective, is the warm fuzzy feeling I get.

So from the standpoint of tangible well-being or tangible self-interest, it’s irrational to sacrifice one’s own tangible well-being in order to improve someone else’s. Only the intangible benefits of our “species-interested” emotions make self-sacrifice rational. It’s a clever software patch, so to speak, that got added to the program late in the product life-cycle, in order to align good old, tried-and-true self-interest with the well-being of others. ...

As long as you admit that well-being is not binary-valued, I agree with you. Specifically, it might be rational to sacrifice a small part of my own well-being to improve someone else’s well-being by a large amount, quite independent of warm fuzzy feelings and conscious self-interest.

What would make it rational independent of warm fuzzy feelings and conscious (tangible) self-interest?

An objective benefit to self from improving someone else’s well-being could make it rational. That benefit need not be accompanied by conscious or unconscious perceptions of self-interest or warm fuzzy feelings. However, most such benefits are mediated by subjective warm fuzzy feelings or subjective conscious/unconscious perception self-interest. The process by which subjective phenomena are associated with objective benefits is of course subject to errors of perception and judgment. Dynamically speaking, errors tend to be negatively reinforced, so a simplistic steady-state rule of thumb is that all objective benefits correspond to subjectively positive phenomena. The rule of thumb is inadequate for understanding how the association comes to be, remains stable, or breaks down.

I’m of course using rational in a sense that does not equate to subjective judgment, experience, or processes, but to some process that can in principle be observed objectively. This is exactly the same sense in which homo economicus is said to behave rationally.

 

Doesn’t “objective benefit to self” imply a dependence on conscious (tangible) self-interest? Maybe it would help to provide an example.

 
 
Poldano
 
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Poldano
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30 April 2016 22:49
 
Antisocialdarwinist - 30 April 2016 01:59 PM
Poldano - 29 April 2016 08:28 PM
Antisocialdarwinist - 29 April 2016 07:12 AM
Poldano - 28 April 2016 11:22 PM
Antisocialdarwinist - 28 April 2016 07:58 AM

...

Yes, I agree with all of that. But we can still distinguish between what I call tangible and intangible well-being. If I give you the shirt off my back, your tangible well-being improves at the expense of mine. The only thing that makes it worthwhile, from my perspective, is the warm fuzzy feeling I get.

So from the standpoint of tangible well-being or tangible self-interest, it’s irrational to sacrifice one’s own tangible well-being in order to improve someone else’s. Only the intangible benefits of our “species-interested” emotions make self-sacrifice rational. It’s a clever software patch, so to speak, that got added to the program late in the product life-cycle, in order to align good old, tried-and-true self-interest with the well-being of others. ...

As long as you admit that well-being is not binary-valued, I agree with you. Specifically, it might be rational to sacrifice a small part of my own well-being to improve someone else’s well-being by a large amount, quite independent of warm fuzzy feelings and conscious self-interest.

What would make it rational independent of warm fuzzy feelings and conscious (tangible) self-interest?

An objective benefit to self from improving someone else’s well-being could make it rational. That benefit need not be accompanied by conscious or unconscious perceptions of self-interest or warm fuzzy feelings. However, most such benefits are mediated by subjective warm fuzzy feelings or subjective conscious/unconscious perception self-interest. The process by which subjective phenomena are associated with objective benefits is of course subject to errors of perception and judgment. Dynamically speaking, errors tend to be negatively reinforced, so a simplistic steady-state rule of thumb is that all objective benefits correspond to subjectively positive phenomena. The rule of thumb is inadequate for understanding how the association comes to be, remains stable, or breaks down.

I’m of course using rational in a sense that does not equate to subjective judgment, experience, or processes, but to some process that can in principle be observed objectively. This is exactly the same sense in which homo economicus is said to behave rationally.

 

Doesn’t “objective benefit to self” imply a dependence on conscious (tangible) self-interest? Maybe it would help to provide an example.

“Objective benefit to self” can be applied to entirely inorganic entities, as long as “benefit to self” is defined to be synonymous with increasing extension in space and time (i.e., growing, living long and prospering, etc.). Neither consciousness nor a conscious sense of self is needed a priori by the subject in order for benefit to self to exist. That’s a major point of objectivity, I think. For background, I do not see objectivity and subjectivity as ontologically or metaphysically distinct, but only as epistemologically distinct. Each provides a different viewpoint on information, and therefore each has distinct sets of information, but they both share the same causality.

For an example, a virus may thrive in some conditions and be destroyed in other conditions. The conditions in which a virus thrives are an objective benefit to the virus, according to my definition. For another example, dessication is an objective benefit to a sodium chloride crystal, while being submersed in water is the opposite.

For more complex systems, objective benefit might be very complex. It is almost impossible to determine the entirety of what is objectively beneficial to humans, for example, at least by humans themselves. Simple spacetime extent trades off with some attributes that are not very easily quantified. For example, is it better for humanity to have a great many members living in subsistence poverty, or to have fewer members with greater material wealth? Right now, we may only have subjective preferential answers to that question. The lack of any current objective material measurement does not imply that material measurement is impossible in principle, only that we haven’t yet figured out how to do it.

 
 
Poldano
 
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01 May 2016 03:00
 
nonverbal - 30 April 2016 05:56 AM
Poldano - 29 April 2016 08:01 PM

Morality is not reducible to biochemistry’s current domain of study. Biochemistry abstracts from life processes those that are found at the chemical level. I currently believe that proto-morality cannot emerge until after replication is well established. It is conceivable that it could emerge at some lower scale, but we have not yet seen evidence of the complexity required to support such processes at those scales.

This is brief, but should give adequate hints to my materialist approach to the problem, both philosophically and biologically.

That’s an interesting take on the question, Poldano. I think that “biochemistry” is being used here in a further-reaching way than what the academic field currently devotes its energies to.

It depends on what the label “biochemistry” is being used for. There are two different ways that I can think of. If the term is being used to describe a level of explanation, then my distinction holds. Biochemical explanation simply becomes too complex to use in explaining evolutionary concepts above the cellular level, for example. Although there is some theoretical seamless transition between the levels, for convenience of understanding we tend to break the levels up. A similar situation applies to quantum mechanics and any kind of chemistry. It is theoretically possible to do molecular chemistry using quantum mechanics, but that is not done except (perhaps) to demonstrate theoretical compatibility because it is too computationally intensive. This is the kind of distinction I used when I made the statement about biochemistry’s domain.

On the other hand, if the label “biochemistry” is being used as a tag for any and all physicalist (or materialist) explanations, then it comes close to an establishment of an a priori ontological dualism (very close to mind-body dualism, as a matter of fact). This, I think, is wrong. There should be no a priori dualism recognized in the investigation of causality. As I pointed out in my previous response to ASD, I don’t regard objectivity and subjectivity as causally distinct, but merely as epistemologically distinct (i.e., different points of view, or different channels of information). This is the kind of distinction I did not mean when I made the statement about biochemistry’s domain.

In other words, if we want to figure out how things work in the most effective way, we should not use biochemistry as an explanation of morality simply because it’s too complicated to understand that way. Some elements of morality may in fact be observable at the chemical level, but not all of it, and not the parts that make it especially problematic. We should, on the other hand, consider morality—the human practice and the human field of study—as explanations and applications about phenomena in a material reality in which there is no ontological distinction between the mental and the physical, or the subjective and the objective, if we want to understand how reality works at all! This is nothing other than Monism.

[ Edited: 01 May 2016 03:04 by Poldano]
 
 
Antisocialdarwinist
 
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Antisocialdarwinist
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03 May 2016 20:23
 
Poldano - 30 April 2016 10:49 PM
Antisocialdarwinist - 30 April 2016 01:59 PM
Poldano - 29 April 2016 08:28 PM
Antisocialdarwinist - 29 April 2016 07:12 AM
Poldano - 28 April 2016 11:22 PM
Antisocialdarwinist - 28 April 2016 07:58 AM

...

Yes, I agree with all of that. But we can still distinguish between what I call tangible and intangible well-being. If I give you the shirt off my back, your tangible well-being improves at the expense of mine. The only thing that makes it worthwhile, from my perspective, is the warm fuzzy feeling I get.

So from the standpoint of tangible well-being or tangible self-interest, it’s irrational to sacrifice one’s own tangible well-being in order to improve someone else’s. Only the intangible benefits of our “species-interested” emotions make self-sacrifice rational. It’s a clever software patch, so to speak, that got added to the program late in the product life-cycle, in order to align good old, tried-and-true self-interest with the well-being of others. ...

As long as you admit that well-being is not binary-valued, I agree with you. Specifically, it might be rational to sacrifice a small part of my own well-being to improve someone else’s well-being by a large amount, quite independent of warm fuzzy feelings and conscious self-interest.

What would make it rational independent of warm fuzzy feelings and conscious (tangible) self-interest?

An objective benefit to self from improving someone else’s well-being could make it rational. That benefit need not be accompanied by conscious or unconscious perceptions of self-interest or warm fuzzy feelings. However, most such benefits are mediated by subjective warm fuzzy feelings or subjective conscious/unconscious perception self-interest. The process by which subjective phenomena are associated with objective benefits is of course subject to errors of perception and judgment. Dynamically speaking, errors tend to be negatively reinforced, so a simplistic steady-state rule of thumb is that all objective benefits correspond to subjectively positive phenomena. The rule of thumb is inadequate for understanding how the association comes to be, remains stable, or breaks down.

I’m of course using rational in a sense that does not equate to subjective judgment, experience, or processes, but to some process that can in principle be observed objectively. This is exactly the same sense in which homo economicus is said to behave rationally.

 

Doesn’t “objective benefit to self” imply a dependence on conscious (tangible) self-interest? Maybe it would help to provide an example.

“Objective benefit to self” can be applied to entirely inorganic entities, as long as “benefit to self” is defined to be synonymous with increasing extension in space and time (i.e., growing, living long and prospering, etc.). Neither consciousness nor a conscious sense of self is needed a priori by the subject in order for benefit to self to exist. That’s a major point of objectivity, I think. For background, I do not see objectivity and subjectivity as ontologically or metaphysically distinct, but only as epistemologically distinct. Each provides a different viewpoint on information, and therefore each has distinct sets of information, but they both share the same causality.

For an example, a virus may thrive in some conditions and be destroyed in other conditions. The conditions in which a virus thrives are an objective benefit to the virus, according to my definition. For another example, dessication is an objective benefit to a sodium chloride crystal, while being submersed in water is the opposite.

For more complex systems, objective benefit might be very complex. It is almost impossible to determine the entirety of what is objectively beneficial to humans, for example, at least by humans themselves. Simple spacetime extent trades off with some attributes that are not very easily quantified. For example, is it better for humanity to have a great many members living in subsistence poverty, or to have fewer members with greater material wealth? Right now, we may only have subjective preferential answers to that question. The lack of any current objective material measurement does not imply that material measurement is impossible in principle, only that we haven’t yet figured out how to do it.

I’m not sure I’m following you here. Are you suggesting that there exists such behavior which A) results in an objective benefit to myself; AND B) is not in my tangible self-interest; AND C) is not in my intangible self-interest (no warm fuzzy feeling)? Like what?

 
 
Poldano
 
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03 May 2016 23:53
 
Antisocialdarwinist - 03 May 2016 08:23 PM

...

I’m not sure I’m following you here. Are you suggesting that there exists such behavior which A) results in an objective benefit to myself; AND B) is not in my tangible self-interest; AND C) is not in my intangible self-interest (no warm fuzzy feeling)? Like what?

Yes.

The gotcha is that you seem to be defining all forms of self-interest as something that is not only knowable, but that someone actually knows about. On the other hand, I say that it is possible that there are some forms of self-interest that no one knows about, either tangibly (through conscious knowledge of the causality involved), or intangibly (according to your definition, through unconscious adaptations that produce emotional reactions). I am not sure that there are any forms of self-interest that are intrinsically unknowable, but that does not become relevant until the issue of knowable but not yet known become resolved. Forms of self-interest can be behaviors, but they might also be things like attitudes and tendencies that do not manifest in discrete behaviors in some rigorous (e.g., behaviorist) senses; I don’t want to close the book because of definitional ambiguities.

 
 
Antisocialdarwinist
 
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Antisocialdarwinist
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04 May 2016 13:02
 
Poldano - 03 May 2016 11:53 PM
Antisocialdarwinist - 03 May 2016 08:23 PM

...

I’m not sure I’m following you here. Are you suggesting that there exists such behavior which A) results in an objective benefit to myself; AND B) is not in my tangible self-interest; AND C) is not in my intangible self-interest (no warm fuzzy feeling)? Like what?

Yes.

The gotcha is that you seem to be defining all forms of self-interest as something that is not only knowable, but that someone actually knows about. On the other hand, I say that it is possible that there are some forms of self-interest that no one knows about, either tangibly (through conscious knowledge of the causality involved), or intangibly (according to your definition, through unconscious adaptations that produce emotional reactions). I am not sure that there are any forms of self-interest that are intrinsically unknowable, but that does not become relevant until the issue of knowable but not yet known become resolved. Forms of self-interest can be behaviors, but they might also be things like attitudes and tendencies that do not manifest in discrete behaviors in some rigorous (e.g., behaviorist) senses; I don’t want to close the book because of definitional ambiguities.

Still no example, though?

 
 
the Antinihilist
 
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the Antinihilist
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04 May 2016 18:17
 

As I have been reading these past few posts on page 4 of this thread, a central dilemma I am seeing (which I argued in my paper) is the profound leap directly dealing with the is-ought problem. When I talk about biochemistry, I am referring to, very simply, deterministic biological and chemical phenomena of organic beings and the ramifications a strict deterministic philosophy has on human freedom and thus morality. Additionally, I argue that Harris equivocates on the definition of well-being. In one sense, it seems to be reducible to simply refraining from biological or psychological harm and promoting pleasure… but that kind of definition is simply a matter of subjective “good” or “bad”—no where near objective “right” and “wrong” as he attempts to extend it to be. So I would have to say, the finer details being discussed on this page are important, but cannot be considered until the larger philosophical dilemmas are addressed, as argued in my paper.

 
Poldano
 
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04 May 2016 23:32
 
Antisocialdarwinist - 04 May 2016 01:02 PM
Poldano - 03 May 2016 11:53 PM
Antisocialdarwinist - 03 May 2016 08:23 PM

...

I’m not sure I’m following you here. Are you suggesting that there exists such behavior which A) results in an objective benefit to myself; AND B) is not in my tangible self-interest; AND C) is not in my intangible self-interest (no warm fuzzy feeling)? Like what?

Yes.

The gotcha is that you seem to be defining all forms of self-interest as something that is not only knowable, but that someone actually knows about. On the other hand, I say that it is possible that there are some forms of self-interest that no one knows about, either tangibly (through conscious knowledge of the causality involved), or intangibly (according to your definition, through unconscious adaptations that produce emotional reactions). I am not sure that there are any forms of self-interest that are intrinsically unknowable, but that does not become relevant until the issue of knowable but not yet known become resolved. Forms of self-interest can be behaviors, but they might also be things like attitudes and tendencies that do not manifest in discrete behaviors in some rigorous (e.g., behaviorist) senses; I don’t want to close the book because of definitional ambiguities.

Still no example, though?

Here are a couple of examples from Plagues and Peoples, by William H. McNeill.

(1) Marmots in Asia harbor Yersinia Pestis (formerly called Pasteurella Pestis), which causes bubonic plague. Steppe nomads, who hunted marmots for their fur, had traditional mythic beliefs (i.e., souls of departed ancestors might be reincarnated as marmots) that protected them from infection. Specifically, no trapping of marmots was allowed, no sluggish animals could even be touched, and if any animals in a locality exhibited sickness the tribe had to move elsewhere. In 1911, the Manchu Dynasty collapsed, and Chinese were able to move into Manchuria, where some of them took up marmot hunting. A plague epidemic ensued among the Chinese, but not among the Manchurian nomads. The nomads had no real knowledge of the causality of Y. Pestis infections, but nonetheless had cultural rules that effectively reduced their susceptibility. We regard their explanations of those rules as superstitions. Westerners did not understand the efficacy of the rules or perhaps even the entire causality before the events subsequent to 1911.

(2) During the British development of Malaya, Malayan and Chinese workers were subject to higher rates of dengue fever than Tamils. Tamils observed a custom that required them to bring water into their houses only once a day, and not to store it in between times. Dengue fever is caused by a virus spread by several species of Aedes mosquitos, which have short breeding cycles and can breed in very small amounts of standing water. Tamils in Malaya did not know of the causality involved in the propagation of dengue fever, but nonetheless benefited from beliefs and corresponding behavior that reduced their susceptibility to it and thereby benefited from it.

Neither of these examples satisfy extreme skepticism, which may hold the belief (irony intended) that at some point in their cultural history Asian nomad or Tamils established a hypothesis of causation between a particular set of practices and unpleasant consequences (no apologies for the subjectivity of unpleasant). To satisfy extreme skepticism, I would have to find an example of a tendency or behavior that some person is unaware of that has some empirically verifiable benefit to that person that the person is equally unaware of. I say that once I establish such a set of facts, I would thereby make them ineffective for the purposes of example, because the person would then know of the causality and benefit involved, and could moreover claim to have known all along! Such a demand is preposterous, equivalent to the demand for complete knowledge to accept any supposition as pragmatically factual until demonstrated otherwise.

[ Edited: 05 May 2016 22:21 by Poldano]
 
 
icehorse
 
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05 May 2016 08:07
 
the Antinihilist - 04 May 2016 06:17 PM

As I have been reading these past few posts on page 4 of this thread, a central dilemma I am seeing (which I argued in my paper) is the profound leap directly dealing with the is-ought problem. When I talk about biochemistry, I am referring to, very simply, deterministic biological and chemical phenomena of organic beings and the ramifications a strict deterministic philosophy has on human freedom and thus morality. Additionally, I argue that Harris equivocates on the definition of well-being. In one sense, it seems to be reducible to simply refraining from biological or psychological harm and promoting pleasure… but that kind of definition is simply a matter of subjective “good” or “bad”—no where near objective “right” and “wrong” as he attempts to extend it to be. So I would have to say, the finer details being discussed on this page are important, but cannot be considered until the larger philosophical dilemmas are addressed, as argued in my paper.

I might be misreading you, but it seems that part of your argument is that Harris is inconsistent? While that’s a reasonable claim, it’s not reasonable to use his inconsistency as a reason why his other claims might be false. Agreed?

 
 
nonverbal
 
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nonverbal
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05 May 2016 14:33
 
icehorse - 05 May 2016 08:07 AM
the Antinihilist - 04 May 2016 06:17 PM

As I have been reading these past few posts on page 4 of this thread, a central dilemma I am seeing (which I argued in my paper) is the profound leap directly dealing with the is-ought problem. When I talk about biochemistry, I am referring to, very simply, deterministic biological and chemical phenomena of organic beings and the ramifications a strict deterministic philosophy has on human freedom and thus morality. Additionally, I argue that Harris equivocates on the definition of well-being. In one sense, it seems to be reducible to simply refraining from biological or psychological harm and promoting pleasure… but that kind of definition is simply a matter of subjective “good” or “bad”—no where near objective “right” and “wrong” as he attempts to extend it to be. So I would have to say, the finer details being discussed on this page are important, but cannot be considered until the larger philosophical dilemmas are addressed, as argued in my paper.

I might be misreading you, but it seems that part of your argument is that Harris is inconsistent? While that’s a reasonable claim, it’s not reasonable to use his inconsistency as a reason why his other claims might be false. Agreed?

How about if one of the inconsistencies is found in the subtitle of the book itself, as with TML?

 
 
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05 May 2016 14:57
 
nonverbal - 05 May 2016 02:33 PM
icehorse - 05 May 2016 08:07 AM
the Antinihilist - 04 May 2016 06:17 PM

As I have been reading these past few posts on page 4 of this thread, a central dilemma I am seeing (which I argued in my paper) is the profound leap directly dealing with the is-ought problem. When I talk about biochemistry, I am referring to, very simply, deterministic biological and chemical phenomena of organic beings and the ramifications a strict deterministic philosophy has on human freedom and thus morality. Additionally, I argue that Harris equivocates on the definition of well-being. In one sense, it seems to be reducible to simply refraining from biological or psychological harm and promoting pleasure… but that kind of definition is simply a matter of subjective “good” or “bad”—no where near objective “right” and “wrong” as he attempts to extend it to be. So I would have to say, the finer details being discussed on this page are important, but cannot be considered until the larger philosophical dilemmas are addressed, as argued in my paper.

I might be misreading you, but it seems that part of your argument is that Harris is inconsistent? While that’s a reasonable claim, it’s not reasonable to use his inconsistency as a reason why his other claims might be false. Agreed?

How about if one of the inconsistencies is found in the subtitle of the book itself, as with TML?

And thus, the old PR / SH debate circles around once again smile

 
 
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05 May 2016 17:58
 
icehorse - 05 May 2016 02:57 PM

And thus, the old PR / SH debate circles around once again smile

TML also contains inconsistencies other than what’s found glaring from its outer-binding perch. Another, found within the text of the book, surrounds the simultaneous claims that people are, at root, puppets of a sort, lacking the equipment we falsely imagine we have to will even the most basic decision-making processes . . . and that we individuals simultaneously (miraculously?—WTF!) have within us a moral imperative of sorts that hinges on a proposed ability for us to act sensibly and compassionately toward others not in our immediate family, tribe or state.

Or have I misread him? Please correct me.

 
 
icehorse
 
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05 May 2016 19:54
 
nonverbal - 05 May 2016 05:58 PM
icehorse - 05 May 2016 02:57 PM

And thus, the old PR / SH debate circles around once again smile

TML also contains inconsistencies other than what’s found glaring from its outer-binding perch. Another, found within the text of the book, surrounds the simultaneous claims that people are, at root, puppets of a sort, lacking the equipment we falsely imagine we have to will even the most basic decision-making processes . . . and that we individuals simultaneously (miraculously?—WTF!) have within us a moral imperative of sorts that hinges on a proposed ability for us to act sensibly and compassionately toward others not in our immediate family, tribe or state.

Or have I misread him? Please correct me.

As you know I’m a fan of the idea of a science of morality. I don’t agree with Harris when it comes to free will.

 
 
nonverbal
 
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05 May 2016 20:04
 
icehorse - 05 May 2016 07:54 PM
nonverbal - 05 May 2016 05:58 PM
icehorse - 05 May 2016 02:57 PM

And thus, the old PR / SH debate circles around once again smile

TML also contains inconsistencies other than what’s found glaring from its outer-binding perch. Another, found within the text of the book, surrounds the simultaneous claims that people are, at root, puppets of a sort, lacking the equipment we falsely imagine we have to will even the most basic decision-making processes . . . and that we individuals simultaneously (miraculously?—WTF!) have within us a moral imperative of sorts that hinges on a proposed ability for us to act sensibly and compassionately toward others not in our immediate family, tribe or state.

Or have I misread him? Please correct me.

As you know I’m a fan of the idea of a science of morality. I don’t agree with Harris when it comes to free will.

I’m glad to hear that, icehorse. I do, however, agree entirely with Sam Harris about free will in the sense that historically, free will has mostly been a religious concept relating to criminal conduct. Maybe “human will,” or “muted will” would more accurately describe what people have access to.

 
 
icehorse
 
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05 May 2016 20:19
 
nonverbal - 05 May 2016 08:04 PM
icehorse - 05 May 2016 07:54 PM
nonverbal - 05 May 2016 05:58 PM
icehorse - 05 May 2016 02:57 PM

And thus, the old PR / SH debate circles around once again smile

TML also contains inconsistencies other than what’s found glaring from its outer-binding perch. Another, found within the text of the book, surrounds the simultaneous claims that people are, at root, puppets of a sort, lacking the equipment we falsely imagine we have to will even the most basic decision-making processes . . . and that we individuals simultaneously (miraculously?—WTF!) have within us a moral imperative of sorts that hinges on a proposed ability for us to act sensibly and compassionately toward others not in our immediate family, tribe or state.

Or have I misread him? Please correct me.

As you know I’m a fan of the idea of a science of morality. I don’t agree with Harris when it comes to free will.

I’m glad to hear that, icehorse. I do, however, agree entirely with Sam Harris about free will in the sense that historically, free will has mostly been a religious concept relating to criminal conduct. Maybe “human will,” or “muted will” would more accurately describe what people have access to.

So what’s your opinion about how the question of free will would play out in a modern courtroom? (i have jury duty next week)

 
 
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