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27 year-old David Hume: 1, Sam Harris who should know better: 0

 
d0rkyd00d
 
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16 February 2017 12:05
 

I feel obligated to offer this disclosure, because many of the statements I make will be made with undue confidence and implied certainty.  I am a simple armchair philosopher who has never undergone formal training in a college setting, and there are many “deeper” areas of philosophy that I have never delved into.  The language I use to break down why I find your entire take problematic will be as simple as the mind from which it stems.  So there may be a more concise way to phrase this critique with more accurate language a well-studied student of philosophy would employ, but I am limited to the tools I have.

The first error in your line of reasoning, ATJ, stems from this idea that there are “two different philosophical worlds,” which is, at best, a false dichotomy, and to me just appears to be a confusion of what philosophy even is.  So I will attempt to “steel man” what you are saying to see if I understand what you are getting at.

Bertrand Russell said,” “The theoretical understanding of the world, which is the aim of philosophy, is not a matter of great practical importance to animals, or to savages, or even to most civilised men.”  There is only one world: the world in which we live.  Philosophy is an attempt to understand that world.  There is no world one and world two.  What I think you are getting at is that there is an aspect to epistemology that raises the question of whether or not it is possible to “know” anything, and you are arguing that there is no practical path to follow if we do not first start with at least a basic assumption that there is a world out there to know, and that we can gain a better understanding of it through tools like logic and science.  If that is the point you are making, then I agree and grant you that. 

But then you go on to assert that the problem with defining words only exists in “world #1,” which as I mentioned before, is a delusion.  There is only our world, and the problem with defining terms exists regardless of how inconvenient it is, and continues to plague us even if we grant that there is a world that is knowable.  In a discussion like this, we must define terms just so we can know what it is precisely we are arguing, since it is common for words to mean different things to different people.

“A foundational axiom that a rational understanding of the universe is good.”

We have to be clear about words and what they represent.  The word chair refers to something with a specific form and function, and there is an entire class of words like this.  Then there is a word like “good,” which is an abstract concept, like honor or justice.  So defining terms like good is not only essential for discussion to proceed, but now we are wandering into the world of arbitrary definitions, since there is no external referent in the same way that there is for chair.  So you can define “good” however you would like, but I can either accept your definition of good or reject it, if I find it lacking.  Now it appears you are defining good as “maximizing the well-being of conscious creatures.”  If this is the case, then your statement really is “A rational understanding of the universe maximizes the well-being of conscious creatures.”  If this is your assertion, then I have a question: Is this assertion true all of the time?  To me, the answer is obviously no. 

I am going to leave it there for now, as I don’t have time to get back into that pesky is/ought distinction, but I also don’t think it is worth getting into since it appears intrinsically linked to this world #1 and world #2 idea, which I find nonsensical.

 
icehorse
 
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16 February 2017 12:18
 

dorky said:

Now it appears you are defining good as “maximizing the well-being of conscious creatures.”  If this is the case, then your statement really is “A rational understanding of the universe maximizes the well-being of conscious creatures.”  If this is your assertion, then I have a question: Is this assertion true all of the time?  To me, the answer is obviously no.

In this case, I’d say you can’t really talk about anything else until you’ve agreed on an axiom or two. IMO it’s useless to debate about things that rely on axioms if you’re not agreed on the axioms. Unless you’re specifically debating axioms.

 
 
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16 February 2017 13:32
 
icehorse - 16 February 2017 12:18 PM

dorky said:

Now it appears you are defining good as “maximizing the well-being of conscious creatures.”  If this is the case, then your statement really is “A rational understanding of the universe maximizes the well-being of conscious creatures.”  If this is your assertion, then I have a question: Is this assertion true all of the time?  To me, the answer is obviously no.

In this case, I’d say you can’t really talk about anything else until you’ve agreed on an axiom or two. IMO it’s useless to debate about things that rely on axioms if you’re not agreed on the axioms. Unless you’re specifically debating axioms.

I think I did that, although I find the term axiom confusing.

I said that I grant that we have to at least start with the presupposition that there is an external world, and that it is possible to gain a better understanding of that external world via methods such as science and reason.  We can also throw in the assumption that there are other minds that exist outside of our own.  Not sure what else you really need to get started….

 
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16 February 2017 13:39
 
d0rkyd00d - 16 February 2017 01:32 PM
icehorse - 16 February 2017 12:18 PM

dorky said:

Now it appears you are defining good as “maximizing the well-being of conscious creatures.”  If this is the case, then your statement really is “A rational understanding of the universe maximizes the well-being of conscious creatures.”  If this is your assertion, then I have a question: Is this assertion true all of the time?  To me, the answer is obviously no.

In this case, I’d say you can’t really talk about anything else until you’ve agreed on an axiom or two. IMO it’s useless to debate about things that rely on axioms if you’re not agreed on the axioms. Unless you’re specifically debating axioms.

I think I did that, although I find the term axiom confusing.

I said that I grant that we have to at least start with the presupposition that there is an external world, and that it is possible to gain a better understanding of that external world via methods such as science and reason.  We can also throw in the assumption that there are other minds that exist outside of our own.  Not sure what else you really need to get started….

I rudely inserted myself into your conversation. My sense is that dorky and ATJ haven’t yet agreed to the same set of axioms or haven’t agreed that what they’re really debating is axioms (or not)

sorry for any confusion my detour has created.

 
 
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17 February 2017 07:16
 

@ d0rkyd00d

The first error in your line of reasoning, ATJ, stems from this idea that there are “two different philosophical worlds,” which is, at best, a false dichotomy, and to me just appears to be a confusion of what philosophy even is.

Please understand that my statement here wasn’t meant as some kind of grand philosophical revelation; it was simply an observation of the kinds of conversations people have - and specifically, in this situation, a conversation between Sam Harris and Jordan Peterson. You can call it anything you want - bottom line is that Peterson’s position was rooted upon a premise that we can’t call anything ‘true’ until we know whether or not that thing doesn’t ultimately kill us (as a species). This framework - if held to - renders any conversation functionally useless because the only point where we’ll be able to deem something as ‘true’ is the point when everyone’s dead (a time in which no one would be left to acknowledge what was ‘true’). Again, call it what you’d like, that’s a different ‘philosophical world’ than a conversational premise like “There is only one world: the world in which we live.  Philosophy is an attempt to understand that world.  There is no world one and world two”.

But then you go on to assert that the problem with defining words only exists in “world #1,” which as I mentioned before, is a delusion.  There is only our world, and the problem with defining terms exists regardless of how inconvenient it is, and continues to plague us even if we grant that there is a world that is knowable.

Great, then we can put any disagreement between us to bed entirely because I never said the problem of defining words only exists in “world #1”. Rather, my point was that the problem is literally an unsolvable one in “world #1”, because - as Peterson put it - we’ll never be able to define anything as ‘true’ until we’re dead and gone. So, my point isn’t that the problem of defining words goes away once we move conversation into “world #2”; rather, it’s that the problem actually becomes solvable.

And this seems quite obvious in the fact that we’ve done it in virtually every domain… but for “morality”. THIS is the problem I believe I’ve been speaking to throughout this dialogue (and others): there seems to be no logical reason - once we’ve removed the idea of celestial opinion - to view the concept of ‘objective’ as any different in the domain of morality than we do in any other domain. Yet, when it comes to a statement like “A woman ought not smoke while pregnant”, it seems a fair amount of people reject the notion of calling such a statement an ‘objective’ one solely because ‘oughts’ fall in the domain of ‘morality’. Given all that we know about the impact of smoking while pregnant, what’s left to deny this claim as being an ‘objective’ one? It seems there’s nothing left in “world #2” with which to justify denying it - rather, to make the claim, one has to drift into “world #1”; the one you rightly claim doesn’t actually exist. I agree with you on principle, but yet it seems we still have many people leaping over that void time and again. 

I view the history of philosophy as being part of the problem here. There’s no question the works of thinkers of past centuries is still important today. But, in the world of philosophy, it seems we get tied down to the thoughts of past thinkers more so than we do in other field. For example, in Psychology, Sigmund Freud is still seen as the father of modern Psychology; you can’t pick up any History of Psychology book without Freud being front and center. But, virtually no one in the field still views Freud’s ideas as correct, or functionally useful, anymore. Rather, it’s understood that he was operating in a time and place when we knew scant little about the brain compared to our current understanding of it, and thus he did the best he could with what he had.

I wait anxiously for a field of philosophy that fully makes the same kind of turn, vetting all of the old philosophical wisdom through the machine of modernity. Because the idea that ‘morality’ somehow needs to exist in it’s own cage of reason - different from any other domain - is an idea that’s being used to justify quite a lot of otherwise unjustifiable things. 

 

 

 

[ Edited: 17 February 2017 07:37 by After_The_Jump]
 
icehorse
 
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17 February 2017 07:34
 

FWIW,

Over the last several years there have been many debates on this forum as to whether WBCC is a sufficient axiom to let you use modern critical thinking when grappling with questions of morality and ethics. Some think WBCC is sufficient, others feel that questions of aggregate WBCC are intractable.

Perhaps the takeaway here is that we at least started with a concrete premise (e.g. WBCC).

 
 
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17 February 2017 07:49
 

@ icehorse

Perhaps the takeaway here is that we at least started with a concrete premise (e.g. WBCC).

Perhaps!

Although, I think that’s why the distinction between the two philosophical worlds I mentioned previously is relevant. Because with a view like Peterson’s, acknowledging WBCC as a concrete premise still doesn’t get us anywhere functionally because he pushes the distinction about what’s good for “WBCC” all the way to the point of total annihilation. In other words, his position still leaves us with no way to determine what’s ‘good’ for WBCC because we won’t know for sure until the moment we lose the capacity to know. And, quite paradoxically, once our existence as a species has ended nothing was ‘true’ or ‘good’ for WBCC anyway…. because it all ultimately aided in us going extinct. Peterson never really explained that paradox; how ‘truth’ can be anchored to survival when ultimately, we’re not going to survive.

 
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17 February 2017 07:55
 

ATJ, you’ve lost me completely now. 

This conversation is not the same one as the conversation with Peterson and Harris.  That is a different thread, different subject matter, etc.  Additionally, you wandered back into the world #1 and world #2 comparisons, which as I previously stated, is a fiction. 

Forget the convo between Peterson and Harris, forget the world 1 and world 2 comparisons, and I think the conversation can progress much further.  Maybe.

 
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17 February 2017 07:58
 
After_The_Jump - 17 February 2017 07:49 AM

@ icehorse

Perhaps the takeaway here is that we at least started with a concrete premise (e.g. WBCC).

Perhaps!

Although, I think that’s why the distinction between the two philosophical worlds I mentioned previously is relevant. Because with a view like Peterson’s, acknowledging WBCC as a concrete premise still doesn’t get us anywhere functionally because he pushes the distinction about what’s good for “WBCC” all the way to the point of total annihilation. In other words, his position still leaves us with no way to determine what’s ‘good’ for WBCC because we won’t know for sure until the moment we lose the capacity to know. And, quite paradoxically, once our existence as a species has ended nothing was ‘true’ or ‘good’ for WBCC anyway…. because it all ultimately aided in us going extinct. Peterson never really explained that paradox; how ‘truth’ can be anchored to survival when ultimately, we’re not going to survive.

All I know of this Peterson dude is what you’ve said here. Based on that, I’d say his premise isn’t worth exploring.

 
 
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17 February 2017 09:39
 

@ d0rkyd00d

This conversation is not the same one as the conversation with Peterson and Harris.  That is a different thread, different subject matter, etc.

interesting considering you were the person who first introduced Peterson into our dialogue on this thread. Specifically, in post #15, you claimed that Harris’s position on the moral landscape was basically the same as Peterson’s definition of truth (i.e. “defined however we like it”). You then mentioned Peterson again in your next post to say that you only referenced him to illustrate the problems created by leaving words “ill-defined”. You went back to the ‘definition of words’ concept in your next to last post, so I went back to the reference point you offered earlier in our conversation for that concept.

Additionally, you wandered back into the world #1 and world #2 comparisons, which as I previously stated, is a fiction.

Again, I acknowledged that it is a functional fiction. The problem you’ve yet to respond to though is that it seems quite clear a fair number of people are living in that fiction.

Case in point: you compared Harris’s ‘moral landscape’ concept to Peterson’s concept of truth. Harris’s position involves using the best available data in the here and now to make objective truth claims in the here and now (including within the domain of ‘morality’). Peterson’s position is that we can’t make truth claims in the here and now because we won’t know what’s true until we’re sure it doesn’t lead to the demise of civilization. And since there’s no way to know what will lead to the demise of our civilization until civilization is demised, there’s never a point where we can make real truth claims about anything.

There’s no logical basis to claim those two positions are functionally similar *unless* you’re operating in a philosophical world where nothing can really be known about anything - i.e. the philosophical world #1 I mentioned which you claim is ‘fiction’. So, while you can certainly keep claiming the idea of two philosophical worlds is ‘fiction’, it’s clear people continue to anchor some of their positions about various topics - and specifically positions on morality - in that fictional world.

That’s my point and your earlier conflation of Harris’s moral landscape being similar to Peterson’s concept of truth is a perfect example of that point.

Anyhow, if you want to keep Peterson’s views (and the podcast with Harris) out of the discussion, fine. But you were the person who introduced it first, and you did so explicitly as it relates to how words and concepts are defined.

Lastly, I didn’t mention Peterson in any of the following paragraphs; thus, I’d be interested in reading your response to these paragraphs that goes farther than “I already called it fiction” because I addressed that point directly in the following paragraphs (Note: since you seem turned off by the “worlds” references, I changed those labels to the specific descriptor):

THIS is the problem I believe I’ve been speaking to throughout this dialogue (and others): there seems to be no logical reason - once we’ve removed the idea of celestial opinion - to view the concept of ‘objective’ as any different in the domain of morality than we do in any other domain. Yet, when it comes to a statement like “A woman ought not smoke while pregnant”, it seems a fair amount of people reject the notion of calling such a statement an ‘objective’ one solely because ‘oughts’ fall in the domain of ‘morality’. Given all that we know about the impact of smoking while pregnant, what’s left to deny this claim as being an ‘objective’ one? It seems there’s nothing left in the realm of known facts with which to justify denying it. Rather, to deny the claim, one has to drift into the mindset that we really can’t know anything about anything; i.e. the philosophical landscape you rightly claim doesn’t functionally exist. I agree with you in principle, but yet it seems we still have many people leaping over that void time and again.

I view the history of philosophy as being part of the problem here. There’s no question the works of thinkers of past centuries is still important today. But, in the world of philosophy, it seems we get tied down to the thoughts of past thinkers more so than we do in other fields. For example, in Psychology, Sigmund Freud is still seen as the father of modern Psychology; you can’t pick up any History of Psychology book without Freud being front and center. But, virtually no one in the field still views Freud’s ideas as correct, or functionally useful, anymore. Rather, it’s understood that he was operating in a time and place when we knew scant little about the brain compared to our current understanding of it, and thus he did the best he could with what he had.

I wait anxiously for a field of philosophy that fully makes the same kind of turn, vetting all of the old philosophical wisdom through the machine of modernity. Because the idea that ‘morality’ somehow needs to exist in it’s own cage of reason - different from any other domain - is an idea that’s being used to justify quite a lot of otherwise unjustifiable things.

[ Edited: 17 February 2017 10:44 by After_The_Jump]
 
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17 February 2017 10:58
 

If I knew that simply making a comparison in passing would then become the only context through which you discuss the issue, I wouldn’t have made it in the first place.  Why it has become the centerpiece of the entire conversation is beyond me. 

So, while you can certainly keep claiming the idea of two philosophical worlds is ‘fiction’, it’s clear people continue to anchor some of their positions about various topics - and specifically positions on morality - in that fictional world.

I will reiterate, people might take a different path if they disagree with what I just said: that there is an external world, and we can learn and discover more about that world.  If you disagree with that basic premise, or if your premise that the world is only knowable to the extent that it helps us survive, then that launches you in a different direction that I have yet to make sense of, and I don’t have much interest in.  Nor do I think it is necessary or relevant for this particular conversation.

The reason I didn’t respond to the remainder is because it didn’t make any sense to me. You state:

there seems to be no logical reason - once we’ve removed the idea of celestial opinion - to view the concept of ‘objective’ as any different in the domain of morality than we do in any other domain.

What reason do you have to believe THAT statement is true?  What is the logical reason we can conclude that objectivity in the realm of morality is the same as that of physics?  I would be interested in seeing the formal argument for that.  Do you think conclusions reached inductively and deductively should be held as equals? 

The rest of your post, regarding knowledge from years past, seems just as misplaced as the first time you raised the topic.  Pythagorean lived over 2000 years ago, but it’s not like our modern understanding of mathematics has rendered Pythagorean’s theorem useless.  So what revelation in modern philosophy would have rendered Hume’s points null and void?

 
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17 February 2017 13:03
 

@ d0rkyd00d

If I knew that simply making a comparison in passing would then become the only context through which you discuss the issue, I wouldn’t have made it in the first place.  Why it has become the centerpiece of the entire conversation is beyond me.

It’s clearly not the only context which I’m discussing the issue; I’ve provided multiple working examples to illustrate my position. I went back to it because it was the reference point you provided for one particular strand of the discussion you went back to. 

What reason do you have to believe THAT statement is true?  What is the logical reason we can conclude that objectivity in the realm of morality is the same as that of physics?

If we’re agreeing to remove celestial influence and thus confining the discussion to just the natural world (and it seems you agreed to that stipulation), there’s no other ‘realm’ for ‘morality’ to exist in other than the one ‘physics’ exists in. In other words, short divine implications, everything exists in the same realm - given the agreed upon stipulation, it could be no other way.

Thus, how do you justify treating morality as if the tools we use to determine objective truths in the natural world somehow don’t apply to morality. You seem to stipulate to the notion of removing celestial influence from the discussion, yet you still seem to act as if morality can, should, and/or could sit outside of the truth rules we apply to the rest of the natural world. What realm are you recognizing that exists between the natural world and a supernatural one?

Pythagorean lived over 2000 years ago, but it’s not like our modern understanding of mathematics has rendered Pythagorean’s theorem useless.

Yes, I stated very clearly a desire for old knowledge to be run through the rigors of modernity. Some will hold up, some won’t.

So what revelation in modern philosophy would have rendered Hume’s points null and void?

What we’ve learned since the 1700s about the brain development - and human development generally - renders the idea of separate ‘realms’ for morality and everything else a rather baseless distinction. Again, what other ‘realm’ could morality exist - given what we know about the world we live in - other than the one every other domain lives in? I’ve provided several working examples to illustrate this, the most recent being a statements like “Not smoking while pregnant is better than smoking while pregnant” and “A woman ought not smoke while pregnant”. Doing away with the concept of celestial influence, what ‘realm’ are you going to pull information from to refute either of those two statements as being ‘objective’ statements of fact?

 

 

 

[ Edited: 17 February 2017 15:25 by After_The_Jump]
 
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17 February 2017 13:56
 
After_The_Jump - 17 February 2017 01:03 PM

If we’re agreeing to remove celestial influence and thus confining the discussion to just the natural world (and it seems you agreed to that stipulation), there’s no other ‘realm’ for ‘morality’ to exist in other than the one ‘physics’ exists in. In other words, short divine implications, everything exists in the same realm - given the agreed upon stipulation, it could be no other way.

Thus, how do you justify treating morality as if the tools we use to determine objective truths in the natural world somehow don’t apply to morality. You seem to stipulate to the notion of removing celestial influence from the discussion, yet you still seem to act as if morality can, should, and/or could sit outside of the truth rules we apply to the rest of the natural world. What realm are you recognizing that exists between the natural world and a supernatural one?

Okay, this clarifies the disagreement for me.  I think you are making a classification, or categorization error, then, which I referred to previously.  Do you think “good” and “aluminum” are categorically different?  I think it is obviously so.  I would be interested to hear if and why you disagree.

 
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17 February 2017 15:49
 

@ d0rkyd00d

I think you are making a classification, or categorization error, then, which I referred to previously.  Do you think “good” and “aluminum” are categorically different?

My argument isn’t that anthropocentric concepts and non-anthropocentric concepts are categorically the same. So yes, I do view ‘good’ and ‘aluminum’ as categorically different.

My claim is that there are both (1) objective anthropocentric and (2) objective non-anthropocentric facts; i.e. there exists observable evidence in our world to make truth claims about both categories.

 

[ Edited: 17 February 2017 15:54 by After_The_Jump]
 
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17 February 2017 22:50
 
d0rkyd00d - 16 February 2017 12:05 PM

I feel obligated to offer this disclosure, because many of the statements I make will be made with undue confidence and implied certainty.  I am a simple armchair philosopher who has never undergone formal training in a college setting, and there are many “deeper” areas of philosophy that I have never delved into.  The language I use to break down why I find your entire take problematic will be as simple as the mind from which it stems.  So there may be a more concise way to phrase this critique with more accurate language a well-studied student of philosophy would employ, but I am limited to the tools I have.

The first error in your line of reasoning, ATJ, stems from this idea that there are “two different philosophical worlds,” which is, at best, a false dichotomy, and to me just appears to be a confusion of what philosophy even is.  So I will attempt to “steel man” what you are saying to see if I understand what you are getting at.

Bertrand Russell said,” “The theoretical understanding of the world, which is the aim of philosophy, is not a matter of great practical importance to animals, or to savages, or even to most civilised men.”  There is only one world: the world in which we live.  Philosophy is an attempt to understand that world.  There is no world one and world two.  What I think you are getting at is that there is an aspect to epistemology that raises the question of whether or not it is possible to “know” anything, and you are arguing that there is no practical path to follow if we do not first start with at least a basic assumption that there is a world out there to know, and that we can gain a better understanding of it through tools like logic and science.  If that is the point you are making, then I agree and grant you that. 

But then you go on to assert that the problem with defining words only exists in “world #1,” which as I mentioned before, is a delusion.  There is only our world, and the problem with defining terms exists regardless of how inconvenient it is, and continues to plague us even if we grant that there is a world that is knowable.  In a discussion like this, we must define terms just so we can know what it is precisely we are arguing, since it is common for words to mean different things to different people.

“A foundational axiom that a rational understanding of the universe is good.”

We have to be clear about words and what they represent.  The word chair refers to something with a specific form and function, and there is an entire class of words like this.  Then there is a word like “good,” which is an abstract concept, like honor or justice.  So defining terms like good is not only essential for discussion to proceed, but now we are wandering into the world of arbitrary definitions, since there is no external referent in the same way that there is for chair.  So you can define “good” however you would like, but I can either accept your definition of good or reject it, if I find it lacking.  Now it appears you are defining good as “maximizing the well-being of conscious creatures.”  If this is the case, then your statement really is “A rational understanding of the universe maximizes the well-being of conscious creatures.”  If this is your assertion, then I have a question: Is this assertion true all of the time?  To me, the answer is obviously no. 

I am going to leave it there for now, as I don’t have time to get back into that pesky is/ought distinction, but I also don’t think it is worth getting into since it appears intrinsically linked to this world #1 and world #2 idea, which I find nonsensical.

I cant believe I read this.

 
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