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Extrasensory perception?

 
TheAnal_lyticPhilosopher
 
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TheAnal_lyticPhilosopher
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09 January 2019 04:25
 

Not a lot to disagree with, although I do have a different take on things. As I see it, Aristotle had to develop his logic in order to resolve the issue of how to make a non-sophistical argument. Without that, the early science of the Greek and Hellenistic periods wouldn’t have been possible. Then the Medieval philosophers came along and that was what they had to work with (the Platonic and other influences came in later, mainly from Byzantium). I think we’re pretty much on the same page of what the did with it, but I don’t think that empirical science could have arisen without that work. Then there was a brief interlude of Renaissance natural magic (Prospero) as the Aristotelian view collapsed, followed by the development of empirical methods (Bacon), the recognition of math as important for science, and the development of validity criteria for physio-mathematical theory (Newton). So I see two steps, first the development of validity criteria for philosophical theorizing (Aristotle, then the Medievals), then the development of validity criteria for empirical work so that now we have a rational-empirical science. I’d project this further (a long term project for me) and say that we still need to develop validity criteria for looking at different worldviews, or paradigms.

Perhaps we can agree that when it comes to the deductive side of inquiry—i.e. the development of implications in order to arrange existing facts and to establish expectations for as yet unobserved ones—Aristotle’s general logic, once purged of its implicit ontology and insistence as exclusive method, is useful.  It helps us avoid illogical errors that would retard inquiry, like what you did with Speakpigeon’s syllogism in the conscious mind thread.  Using the basic rules of logical inference, we can both order what’s established and avoid mis-ordering it in ways that lead to misdirecting anticipations, thus facilitating as such the interpretative framework for empirical observation and testing.

Where we still differ, I think, is on the project for developing “validity criteria” for different world views or paradigms, or more generally, on the notion of “validity criteria” itself.  I am not sure I understand what you mean, but based on what I do understand about them, I am not convinced that is a practicable, or even necessary, task.  As it’s customarily posed I suspect—without being able to justify the suspicion—establishing “validity criteria” may be a hold-over expectation from philosophically mistaken views of justifying knowledge in some kind of antecedent apprehension—a quest I think upended by both the progress of natural science and the development of pragmatism (Peirce and Dewey, not James).  But the rub is: just what is the nature of these validity criteria?  Validity criteria can be developed without reference to grounding in apprehension of antecedent surety against which competing claims can be arbitrated.  Criteria can be developed internally, as it were.  And maybe in this internal development our long-terms projects converge (for this underlying problem, stated somewhat differently, is mine as well).  In any case, for my part I am not so much looking for validity criteria as wondering if validity itself, absent some pre-existing criteria, can be developed in a communicative rationality, one where consensus and convergence either happens or it doesn’t—and where it doesn’t mutual compromise over common ground can yet be established, one that simultaneously protects the divergence and avoids conflicts.  This would require not so much developing validity criteria as articulating a logic for carrying out successful inquiry and developing an ‘institutional’ framework for promoting it. 

As for that logic, what I take from Peirce and Dewey and the failure of analytic philosophy is an abandonment of seeking any over-arching or under-pinning framework for arbitrating paradigms—one interpretation of “validity criteria.”  Following them, the focus is instead on understanding the conditions and inner logic of successful inquiry, then applying that logic and establishing those conditions into areas where old methods have hitherto prevailed—like in the social sciences, which are dominated by paradigms and world-views.  The hope there, I think, is that once these tried and true methods are brought to bear, divergent paradigms will quite on their own evolution fall away, as they have tended to in the self-correcting enterprises of physics, chemistry, and biology.  This, at least, is the approach I am taking without dismissing with any apriori surety or argument that the approach of “validity criteria” is wrong.  Mine is only an hypothesis, but it might differ, I think, from seeking “validity criteria.”  If someone can come up with those, perfect, but given the inherently probable nature of uncertain inquiry, I wonder if any kind other than internally worked out logics are even possible. 

Russell and Husserl certainly thought they were, and I have no effective arguments against the idea that they are possible.  Indeed, any ostensible proof that they are impossible would entail a blatant inconsistency on my part.

 

[ Edited: 09 January 2019 04:38 by TheAnal_lyticPhilosopher]
 
burt
 
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burt
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09 January 2019 10:59
 
TheAnal_lyticPhilosopher - 09 January 2019 04:25 AM

Not a lot to disagree with, although I do have a different take on things. As I see it, Aristotle had to develop his logic in order to resolve the issue of how to make a non-sophistical argument. Without that, the early science of the Greek and Hellenistic periods wouldn’t have been possible. Then the Medieval philosophers came along and that was what they had to work with (the Platonic and other influences came in later, mainly from Byzantium). I think we’re pretty much on the same page of what the did with it, but I don’t think that empirical science could have arisen without that work. Then there was a brief interlude of Renaissance natural magic (Prospero) as the Aristotelian view collapsed, followed by the development of empirical methods (Bacon), the recognition of math as important for science, and the development of validity criteria for physio-mathematical theory (Newton). So I see two steps, first the development of validity criteria for philosophical theorizing (Aristotle, then the Medievals), then the development of validity criteria for empirical work so that now we have a rational-empirical science. I’d project this further (a long term project for me) and say that we still need to develop validity criteria for looking at different worldviews, or paradigms.

Perhaps we can agree that when it comes to the deductive side of inquiry—i.e. the development of implications in order to arrange existing facts and to establish expectations for as yet unobserved ones—Aristotle’s general logic, once purged of its implicit ontology and insistence as exclusive method, is useful.  It helps us avoid illogical errors that would retard inquiry, like what you did with Speakpigeon’s syllogism in the conscious mind thread.  Using the basic rules of logical inference, we can both order what’s established and avoid mis-ordering it in ways that lead to misdirecting anticipations, thus facilitating as such the interpretative framework for empirical observation and testing.

Where we still differ, I think, is on the project for developing “validity criteria” for different world views or paradigms, or more generally, on the notion of “validity criteria” itself.  I am not sure I understand what you mean, but based on what I do understand about them, I am not convinced that is a practicable, or even necessary, task.  As it’s customarily posed I suspect—without being able to justify the suspicion—establishing “validity criteria” may be a hold-over expectation from philosophically mistaken views of justifying knowledge in some kind of antecedent apprehension—a quest I think upended by both the progress of natural science and the development of pragmatism (Peirce and Dewey, not James).  But the rub is: just what is the nature of these validity criteria?  Validity criteria can be developed without reference to grounding in apprehension of antecedent surety against which competing claims can be arbitrated.  Criteria can be developed internally, as it were.  And maybe in this internal development our long-terms projects converge (for this underlying problem, stated somewhat differently, is mine as well).  In any case, for my part I am not so much looking for validity criteria as wondering if validity itself, absent some pre-existing criteria, can be developed in a communicative rationality, one where consensus and convergence either happens or it doesn’t—and where it doesn’t mutual compromise over common ground can yet be established, one that simultaneously protects the divergence and avoids conflicts.  This would require not so much developing validity criteria as articulating a logic for carrying out successful inquiry and developing an ‘institutional’ framework for promoting it. 

As for that logic, what I take from Peirce and Dewey and the failure of analytic philosophy is an abandonment of seeking any over-arching or under-pinning framework for arbitrating paradigms—one interpretation of “validity criteria.”  Following them, the focus is instead on understanding the conditions and inner logic of successful inquiry, then applying that logic and establishing those conditions into areas where old methods have hitherto prevailed—like in the social sciences, which are dominated by paradigms and world-views.  The hope there, I think, is that once these tried and true methods are brought to bear, divergent paradigms will quite on their own evolution fall away, as they have tended to in the self-correcting enterprises of physics, chemistry, and biology.  This, at least, is the approach I am taking without dismissing with any apriori surety or argument that the approach of “validity criteria” is wrong.  Mine is only an hypothesis, but it might differ, I think, from seeking “validity criteria.”  If someone can come up with those, perfect, but given the inherently probable nature of uncertain inquiry, I wonder if any kind other than internally worked out logics are even possible. 

Russell and Husserl certainly thought they were, and I have no effective arguments against the idea that they are possible.  Indeed, any ostensible proof that they are impossible would entail a blatant inconsistency on my part.

I suspect that my comments about validity criteria acted as trigger words so a bit of clarification might help. I’m not saying that we want a priori criteria, rather much like you suggest, that they arise out of the necessity of the methods. To give some background: back in the late 80s I was tasked with developing a course in scientific reasoning for my university BSc program. I started off looking at reasoning in general, even magical thinking, to get some background. One of the things I came across was the literature on “decision heuristics” or “cognitive illusions.” This grew out of studies by Amos Tversky and Daniel Khaneman on decision making under uncertainty. Their work showed that generally people did not use logic or probability analysis but rather relied on three general heuristics which they called representativeness, availability, and anchoring. Much of the following research was focused on how use of these heuristics led to errors (when compared to more formal methods) that were called cognitive illusions (and much debate as to whether this work indicated that humans were not rational—the Mercier & Sperber book mentions these). What occurred to me, however, was that these three heuristics were the necessary elements for using language to describe experience, so that the idea was not to develop anything new but rather find ways of avoiding the errors that they were vulnerable too. Which led to the idea of looking at the history of science in terms of elimination of illusions. When I started doing this it seemed that there were three crisis periods: ancient Greece, the Seventeenth Century; and today, each associated primarily with one of the heuristics. The Greeks had to deal with the rules (validity criteria) for categorical thinking (representativeness) and over about 150 years worked these out. Then in the 17th century with the beginning of empirical science it became necessary to develop rules for evaluation of experimental results (availability, how to sort out from everything that was available what was significant), another 150 years or so, ending up with statistics, probability theory, and repeatability as the appropriate tools. Based on that, my guess is that the issue today centers around anchoring (the influence of pre-established ideas, the way paradigms arise and are evaluated, etc.) and those rules are still being worked out (without general consciousness that this is what’s going on). I think this goes to your idea of an institutional framework. A book I found interesting for this is Roland Omnès Quantum Philosophy. Have to go but will continue this interesting conversation.

 
TheAnal_lyticPhilosopher
 
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TheAnal_lyticPhilosopher
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09 January 2019 12:42
 
burt - 09 January 2019 10:59 AM
TheAnal_lyticPhilosopher - 09 January 2019 04:25 AM

Not a lot to disagree with, although I do have a different take on things. As I see it, Aristotle had to develop his logic in order to resolve the issue of how to make a non-sophistical argument. Without that, the early science of the Greek and Hellenistic periods wouldn’t have been possible. Then the Medieval philosophers came along and that was what they had to work with (the Platonic and other influences came in later, mainly from Byzantium). I think we’re pretty much on the same page of what the did with it, but I don’t think that empirical science could have arisen without that work. Then there was a brief interlude of Renaissance natural magic (Prospero) as the Aristotelian view collapsed, followed by the development of empirical methods (Bacon), the recognition of math as important for science, and the development of validity criteria for physio-mathematical theory (Newton). So I see two steps, first the development of validity criteria for philosophical theorizing (Aristotle, then the Medievals), then the development of validity criteria for empirical work so that now we have a rational-empirical science. I’d project this further (a long term project for me) and say that we still need to develop validity criteria for looking at different worldviews, or paradigms.

Perhaps we can agree that when it comes to the deductive side of inquiry—i.e. the development of implications in order to arrange existing facts and to establish expectations for as yet unobserved ones—Aristotle’s general logic, once purged of its implicit ontology and insistence as exclusive method, is useful.  It helps us avoid illogical errors that would retard inquiry, like what you did with Speakpigeon’s syllogism in the conscious mind thread.  Using the basic rules of logical inference, we can both order what’s established and avoid mis-ordering it in ways that lead to misdirecting anticipations, thus facilitating as such the interpretative framework for empirical observation and testing.

Where we still differ, I think, is on the project for developing “validity criteria” for different world views or paradigms, or more generally, on the notion of “validity criteria” itself.  I am not sure I understand what you mean, but based on what I do understand about them, I am not convinced that is a practicable, or even necessary, task.  As it’s customarily posed I suspect—without being able to justify the suspicion—establishing “validity criteria” may be a hold-over expectation from philosophically mistaken views of justifying knowledge in some kind of antecedent apprehension—a quest I think upended by both the progress of natural science and the development of pragmatism (Peirce and Dewey, not James).  But the rub is: just what is the nature of these validity criteria?  Validity criteria can be developed without reference to grounding in apprehension of antecedent surety against which competing claims can be arbitrated.  Criteria can be developed internally, as it were.  And maybe in this internal development our long-terms projects converge (for this underlying problem, stated somewhat differently, is mine as well).  In any case, for my part I am not so much looking for validity criteria as wondering if validity itself, absent some pre-existing criteria, can be developed in a communicative rationality, one where consensus and convergence either happens or it doesn’t—and where it doesn’t mutual compromise over common ground can yet be established, one that simultaneously protects the divergence and avoids conflicts.  This would require not so much developing validity criteria as articulating a logic for carrying out successful inquiry and developing an ‘institutional’ framework for promoting it. 

As for that logic, what I take from Peirce and Dewey and the failure of analytic philosophy is an abandonment of seeking any over-arching or under-pinning framework for arbitrating paradigms—one interpretation of “validity criteria.”  Following them, the focus is instead on understanding the conditions and inner logic of successful inquiry, then applying that logic and establishing those conditions into areas where old methods have hitherto prevailed—like in the social sciences, which are dominated by paradigms and world-views.  The hope there, I think, is that once these tried and true methods are brought to bear, divergent paradigms will quite on their own evolution fall away, as they have tended to in the self-correcting enterprises of physics, chemistry, and biology.  This, at least, is the approach I am taking without dismissing with any apriori surety or argument that the approach of “validity criteria” is wrong.  Mine is only an hypothesis, but it might differ, I think, from seeking “validity criteria.”  If someone can come up with those, perfect, but given the inherently probable nature of uncertain inquiry, I wonder if any kind other than internally worked out logics are even possible. 

Russell and Husserl certainly thought they were, and I have no effective arguments against the idea that they are possible.  Indeed, any ostensible proof that they are impossible would entail a blatant inconsistency on my part.

I suspect that my comments about validity criteria acted as trigger words so a bit of clarification might help. I’m not saying that we want a priori criteria, rather much like you suggest, that they arise out of the necessity of the methods. To give some background: back in the late 80s I was tasked with developing a course in scientific reasoning for my university BSc program. I started off looking at reasoning in general, even magical thinking, to get some background. One of the things I came across was the literature on “decision heuristics” or “cognitive illusions.” This grew out of studies by Amos Tversky and Daniel Khaneman on decision making under uncertainty. Their work showed that generally people did not use logic or probability analysis but rather relied on three general heuristics which they called representativeness, availability, and anchoring. Much of the following research was focused on how use of these heuristics led to errors (when compared to more formal methods) that were called cognitive illusions (and much debate as to whether this work indicated that humans were not rational—the Mercier & Sperber book mentions these). What occurred to me, however, was that these three heuristics were the necessary elements for using language to describe experience, so that the idea was not to develop anything new but rather find ways of avoiding the errors that they were vulnerable too. Which led to the idea of looking at the history of science in terms of elimination of illusions. When I started doing this it seemed that there were three crisis periods: ancient Greece, the Seventeenth Century; and today, each associated primarily with one of the heuristics. The Greeks had to deal with the rules (validity criteria) for categorical thinking (representativeness) and over about 150 years worked these out. Then in the 17th century with the beginning of empirical science it became necessary to develop rules for evaluation of experimental results (availability, how to sort out from everything that was available what was significant), another 150 years or so, ending up with statistics, probability theory, and repeatability as the appropriate tools. Based on that, my guess is that the issue today centers around anchoring (the influence of pre-established ideas, the way paradigms arise and are evaluated, etc.) and those rules are still being worked out (without general consciousness that this is what’s going on). I think this goes to your idea of an institutional framework. A book I found interesting for this is Roland Omnès Quantum Philosophy. Have to go but will continue this interesting conversation.

Thanks for the clarification.  I have some thoughts on them but am swamped for the rest of the day myself.  Til’ next time….

 
Speakpigeon
 
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Speakpigeon
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10 January 2019 04:37
 

OK, for people who might be interested in addressing the OP, here it is again…

Sense
Any of the faculties by which stimuli from outside or inside the body are received and felt, as the faculties of hearing, sight, smell, touch, taste, and equilibrium.

Sense
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense
Humans have a multitude of sensors. Sight (vision), hearing (audition), taste (gustation), smell (olfaction), and touch (somatosensation) are the five traditionally recognised senses. The ability to detect other stimuli beyond those governed by these most broadly recognised senses also exists, and these sensory modalities include temperature (thermoception), kinesthetic sense (proprioception), pain (nociception), balance (equilibrioception), vibration (mechanoreception), and various internal stimuli (e.g. the different chemoreceptors for detecting salt and carbon dioxide concentrations in the blood, or sense of hunger and sense of thirst). However, what constitutes a sense is a matter of some debate, leading to difficulties in defining what exactly a distinct sense is, and where the borders lie between responses to related stimuli.

And logic then?! I would submit that we obviously have to have a sense of logic. This allows us to feel intuitively certain that specific logical formula are logical truths and non-sequiturs.

Example: If I believe it’s true that when it rains the ground gets wet and if I can see it is now raining outside then I will believe that the ground outside will be wet. I will make this inference without even being aware I’m making an inference. It’s an intuition.

I couldn’t possibly verify that we all have broadly the same sense of logic but since we all have broadly the same visual sense, sense of hearing, etc., I see not good reason that we should differ much in respect of our logical sense.

So, this leads to the question of why science has not yet recognised, as far as I know, our sense of logic as a sense of perception. Don’t scientists also have logical intuitions? Or is it because they think they are good at logic because they are more intelligent, or perhaps because they have received a formal training?

We’re in 2018, for Christ’s sake. And for not very long. Time to wake up.

Or maybe they can’t be bothered?

Recognising our sense of logic as a sense of perception also avoid the embarrassment of having to rely on extrasensory perception to support our reasoning.
EB

 
burt
 
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burt
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10 January 2019 10:14
 
Speakpigeon - 10 January 2019 04:37 AM

OK, for people who might be interested in addressing the OP, here it is again…

Sense
Any of the faculties by which stimuli from outside or inside the body are received and felt, as the faculties of hearing, sight, smell, touch, taste, and equilibrium.

Sense
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense
Humans have a multitude of sensors. Sight (vision), hearing (audition), taste (gustation), smell (olfaction), and touch (somatosensation) are the five traditionally recognised senses. The ability to detect other stimuli beyond those governed by these most broadly recognised senses also exists, and these sensory modalities include temperature (thermoception), kinesthetic sense (proprioception), pain (nociception), balance (equilibrioception), vibration (mechanoreception), and various internal stimuli (e.g. the different chemoreceptors for detecting salt and carbon dioxide concentrations in the blood, or sense of hunger and sense of thirst). However, what constitutes a sense is a matter of some debate, leading to difficulties in defining what exactly a distinct sense is, and where the borders lie between responses to related stimuli.

And logic then?! I would submit that we obviously have to have a sense of logic. This allows us to feel intuitively certain that specific logical formula are logical truths and non-sequiturs.

Example: If I believe it’s true that when it rains the ground gets wet and if I can see it is now raining outside then I will believe that the ground outside will be wet. I will make this inference without even being aware I’m making an inference. It’s an intuition.

I couldn’t possibly verify that we all have broadly the same sense of logic but since we all have broadly the same visual sense, sense of hearing, etc., I see not good reason that we should differ much in respect of our logical sense.

So, this leads to the question of why science has not yet recognised, as far as I know, our sense of logic as a sense of perception. Don’t scientists also have logical intuitions? Or is it because they think they are good at logic because they are more intelligent, or perhaps because they have received a formal training?

We’re in 2018, for Christ’s sake. And for not very long. Time to wake up.

Or maybe they can’t be bothered?

Recognising our sense of logic as a sense of perception also avoid the embarrassment of having to rely on extrasensory perception to support our reasoning.
EB

Certainly are persistent. https://courses.lumenlearning.com/wmopen-psychology/chapter/outcome-sensation-and-perception/

You need to make the distinction between sense and perception. The brain constructs perceptions out of what is presented by the senses and the construction is for the most part a learned (so culturally dependent) process.

1. Even with sight, we need to learn to see. This is explicitly shown with individuals who have been blind from birth and through medical intervention gain sight.
2. Applying this to logic, one can see the expression of a logical formula, but needs to have learned to see it. Expecting the ground outside to be wet when seeing rain already involves layers of learning.

Applying this to mathematics: From a paper: Embodied Mathematics (Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(9), 2004, 83 - 88)
“Kurt Gödel, an avowed Platonist, maintained that the question of the reality of mathematical objects is no different from the question of the reality of sensory objects. Perceptions of sensory objects are constructed in the mind by cognitive operations on sensory intuitions. Perceptions of mathematical objects are constructed in the mind by cognitive operations on mathematical intuitions. There is no reason, in principal, to privilege one set of perceptions over the other by assigning it ‘true’ reality. What is more fruitful is to explore the nature of the constructions.  ...As often formulated, the problem of access to mind-independent mathematical objects is misconceived. The mystery is not in the ability to perceive mathematical objects, but in the ability to perceive any ‘object’ whatsoever.”

 
Speakpigeon
 
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Speakpigeon
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10 January 2019 13:45
 
burt - 10 January 2019 10:14 AM
Speakpigeon - 10 January 2019 04:37 AM

OK, for people who might be interested in addressing the OP, here it is again…

Sense
Any of the faculties by which stimuli from outside or inside the body are received and felt, as the faculties of hearing, sight, smell, touch, taste, and equilibrium.

Sense
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense
Humans have a multitude of sensors. Sight (vision), hearing (audition), taste (gustation), smell (olfaction), and touch (somatosensation) are the five traditionally recognised senses. The ability to detect other stimuli beyond those governed by these most broadly recognised senses also exists, and these sensory modalities include temperature (thermoception), kinesthetic sense (proprioception), pain (nociception), balance (equilibrioception), vibration (mechanoreception), and various internal stimuli (e.g. the different chemoreceptors for detecting salt and carbon dioxide concentrations in the blood, or sense of hunger and sense of thirst). However, what constitutes a sense is a matter of some debate, leading to difficulties in defining what exactly a distinct sense is, and where the borders lie between responses to related stimuli.

And logic then?! I would submit that we obviously have to have a sense of logic. This allows us to feel intuitively certain that specific logical formula are logical truths and non-sequiturs.

Example: If I believe it’s true that when it rains the ground gets wet and if I can see it is now raining outside then I will believe that the ground outside will be wet. I will make this inference without even being aware I’m making an inference. It’s an intuition.

I couldn’t possibly verify that we all have broadly the same sense of logic but since we all have broadly the same visual sense, sense of hearing, etc., I see not good reason that we should differ much in respect of our logical sense.

So, this leads to the question of why science has not yet recognised, as far as I know, our sense of logic as a sense of perception. Don’t scientists also have logical intuitions? Or is it because they think they are good at logic because they are more intelligent, or perhaps because they have received a formal training?

We’re in 2018, for Christ’s sake. And for not very long. Time to wake up.

Or maybe they can’t be bothered?

Recognising our sense of logic as a sense of perception also avoid the embarrassment of having to rely on extrasensory perception to support our reasoning.
EB

Certainly are persistent. https://courses.lumenlearning.com/wmopen-psychology/chapter/outcome-sensation-and-perception/

You need to make the distinction between sense and perception. The brain constructs perceptions out of what is presented by the senses and the construction is for the most part a learned (so culturally dependent) process.

1. Even with sight, we need to learn to see. This is explicitly shown with individuals who have been blind from birth and through medical intervention gain sight.
2. Applying this to logic, one can see the expression of a logical formula, but needs to have learned to see it. Expecting the ground outside to be wet when seeing rain already involves layers of learning.

You quote my post without addressing what it says. This is pretence.

So for example you keep talking about formal logic even though I already explained to you my OP was not about formal logic but about our intuitive sense of logic. I never argued we had anything like an intuitive sense of formal logic. And I certainly don’t need you to know we have to learn formal logic.

My best interpretation of what you say here is that you just don’t understand what are logical intuitions and therefore you don’t know what logic may be. Basically, you mistake formal logic for logic. A very basic and standard mistake for most people who were trained after the development of what is still presented as the standard formal method of logic.

So, the best you can do is keep derailing about “logical formulas”. You’re basically shadow-boxing. Inevitably, what you say will be irrelevant. So, first, you’d need to get up to speed and learn about logical intuitions. There’s no shame going back to school.

Your assumption that all senses can be treated in the same way has no foundation. Personally, I think of our sense of logic as a capability of the brain, the brain best described as essentially a logical processor, much like we describe the universe using formal “natural laws”, or much like we can describe computer processes using Boolean Algebra.

burt - 10 January 2019 10:14 AM

Applying this to mathematics: From a paper: Embodied Mathematics (Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(9), 2004, 83 - 88)
“Kurt Gödel, an avowed Platonist, maintained that the question of the reality of mathematical objects is no different from the question of the reality of sensory objects. Perceptions of sensory objects are constructed in the mind by cognitive operations on sensory intuitions. Perceptions of mathematical objects are constructed in the mind by cognitive operations on mathematical intuitions. There is no reason, in principal, to privilege one set of perceptions over the other by assigning it ‘true’ reality. What is more fruitful is to explore the nature of the constructions.  ...As often formulated, the problem of access to mind-independent mathematical objects is misconceived. The mystery is not in the ability to perceive mathematical objects, but in the ability to perceive any ‘object’ whatsoever.”

This bit doesn’t seem to relate in any way to what I said. If it does, you certainly do a good job of not explaining yourself. I think more likely you are just mumbling to yourself here.

Still, since you don’t address the points I already made, I guess it would be futile to argue anything else.
EB

[ Edited: 10 January 2019 13:58 by Speakpigeon]
 
burt
 
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burt
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10 January 2019 16:04
 
Speakpigeon - 10 January 2019 01:45 PM
burt - 10 January 2019 10:14 AM
Speakpigeon - 10 January 2019 04:37 AM

OK, for people who might be interested in addressing the OP, here it is again…

Sense
Any of the faculties by which stimuli from outside or inside the body are received and felt, as the faculties of hearing, sight, smell, touch, taste, and equilibrium.

Sense
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense
Humans have a multitude of sensors. Sight (vision), hearing (audition), taste (gustation), smell (olfaction), and touch (somatosensation) are the five traditionally recognised senses. The ability to detect other stimuli beyond those governed by these most broadly recognised senses also exists, and these sensory modalities include temperature (thermoception), kinesthetic sense (proprioception), pain (nociception), balance (equilibrioception), vibration (mechanoreception), and various internal stimuli (e.g. the different chemoreceptors for detecting salt and carbon dioxide concentrations in the blood, or sense of hunger and sense of thirst). However, what constitutes a sense is a matter of some debate, leading to difficulties in defining what exactly a distinct sense is, and where the borders lie between responses to related stimuli.

And logic then?! I would submit that we obviously have to have a sense of logic. This allows us to feel intuitively certain that specific logical formula are logical truths and non-sequiturs.

Example: If I believe it’s true that when it rains the ground gets wet and if I can see it is now raining outside then I will believe that the ground outside will be wet. I will make this inference without even being aware I’m making an inference. It’s an intuition.

I couldn’t possibly verify that we all have broadly the same sense of logic but since we all have broadly the same visual sense, sense of hearing, etc., I see not good reason that we should differ much in respect of our logical sense.

So, this leads to the question of why science has not yet recognised, as far as I know, our sense of logic as a sense of perception. Don’t scientists also have logical intuitions? Or is it because they think they are good at logic because they are more intelligent, or perhaps because they have received a formal training?

We’re in 2018, for Christ’s sake. And for not very long. Time to wake up.

Or maybe they can’t be bothered?

Recognising our sense of logic as a sense of perception also avoid the embarrassment of having to rely on extrasensory perception to support our reasoning.
EB

Certainly are persistent. https://courses.lumenlearning.com/wmopen-psychology/chapter/outcome-sensation-and-perception/

You need to make the distinction between sense and perception. The brain constructs perceptions out of what is presented by the senses and the construction is for the most part a learned (so culturally dependent) process.

1. Even with sight, we need to learn to see. This is explicitly shown with individuals who have been blind from birth and through medical intervention gain sight.
2. Applying this to logic, one can see the expression of a logical formula, but needs to have learned to see it. Expecting the ground outside to be wet when seeing rain already involves layers of learning.

You quote my post without addressing what it says. This is pretence.

So for example you keep talking about formal logic even though I already explained to you my OP was not about formal logic but about our intuitive sense of logic. I never argued we had anything like an intuitive sense of formal logic. And I certainly don’t need you to know we have to learn formal logic.

My best interpretation of what you say here is that you just don’t understand what are logical intuitions and therefore you don’t know what logic may be. Basically, you mistake formal logic for logic. A very basic and standard mistake for most people who were trained after the development of what is still presented as the standard formal method of logic.

So, the best you can do is keep derailing about “logical formulas”. You’re basically shadow-boxing. Inevitably, what you say will be irrelevant. So, first, you’d need to get up to speed and learn about logical intuitions. There’s no shame going back to school.

Your assumption that all senses can be treated in the same way has no foundation. Personally, I think of our sense of logic as a capability of the brain, the brain best described as essentially a logical processor, much like we describe the universe using formal “natural laws”, or much like we can describe computer processes using Boolean Algebra.

burt - 10 January 2019 10:14 AM

Applying this to mathematics: From a paper: Embodied Mathematics (Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(9), 2004, 83 - 88)
“Kurt Gödel, an avowed Platonist, maintained that the question of the reality of mathematical objects is no different from the question of the reality of sensory objects. Perceptions of sensory objects are constructed in the mind by cognitive operations on sensory intuitions. Perceptions of mathematical objects are constructed in the mind by cognitive operations on mathematical intuitions. There is no reason, in principal, to privilege one set of perceptions over the other by assigning it ‘true’ reality. What is more fruitful is to explore the nature of the constructions.  ...As often formulated, the problem of access to mind-independent mathematical objects is misconceived. The mystery is not in the ability to perceive mathematical objects, but in the ability to perceive any ‘object’ whatsoever.”

This bit doesn’t seem to relate in any way to what I said. If it does, you certainly do a good job of not explaining yourself. I think more likely you are just mumbling to yourself here.

Still, since you don’t address the points I already made, I guess it would be futile to argue anything else.
EB

As for knowledge of logical intuition, mathematical intuition, and formal logic I’ve studied these for 40+ years—I do know what I’m talking about. And if you’d read some of my earlier posts with understanding you would see that what I say is not the same as you believe it to be. What you are referring to as “intuitive sense of logic” is what I described in a much earlier post as something far more basic, an intuition of fit—a feeling that something fits (in a given context) or does not. But what’s important is the context, without that there is no way to sense a fit or not, and in every case one must learn how to interpret what is given. That’s why I posted the link on the difference of sense and perception. That applies to all forms of thought: a musician must recognize whether a particular not or musical phrase “fits” into a composition; in seeing, the brain must correlate visual input (the sensed part) into patterns of objects (the perception part); a person living in a magical culture will find different and what to us seem illogical connections, but the same feeling of a fit will be there.

You seem caught up in the computational view of mind with the brain as a logical processor, although since you want to treat logic beyond Boolean and propositional calculus, it’s hard to say what you actually mean. For me the brain and mind are not primarily logical processors, rather they function on pattern recognition, pattern matching, and pattern completion processes, not computational ones (I can dig up a quote from von Neumann to that effect if you wish). So the intuitions underlying even logical thought are all intuitions of fitting between different patterns.

 
TheAnal_lyticPhilosopher
 
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10 January 2019 16:09
 

C’mon burt, don’t bite again.  This guy is the Donald Trump of those with intellectual pretenses.  Trump denies that conversation is even nominally about the truth; to that end he just makes up as he goes whatever he needs to in order to get the result he wants.  Speakpigeon denies that what he says carries any implications beyond the ones he wants; to that end he just denies as he goes that he’s even said the basis of any unwanted implications.  The parallel is equally fascinating and horrifying, and it’s a relief to be ignored by him.  So c’mon, burt, join the Dark Side.  Come to ignore and be ignored!!  Don’t fall for it!  Don’t reply!  You’ll thank me for it later….

As he himself says “it would be futile to argue anything else.”

1. Even with sight, we need to learn to see. This is explicitly shown with individuals who have been blind from birth and through medical intervention gain sight.
2. Applying this to logic, one can see the expression of a logical formula, but needs to have learned to see it. Expecting the ground outside to be wet when seeing rain already involves layers of learning.

Tying this in to what else you’ve noted about culture, environment, leaning, IQ, and race…

When the “race realists” did their IQ testing on African kids, they mostly relied on the Raven Matrices subcomponent because of the language barriers to standard IQ tests.  Their reasoning was this subcomponent most strongly correlates with g, their fixed latent factor of general intelligence.  The problem with this: the Raven Matrices are geometrically designed visual tests with ‘logical’ patterns to be detected.  These patterns mainly rely on various orientations and figures with right, acute and isosceles angles—basic elements very reflective of the basic visual elements of the room I am writing from now, and in general reflective of the visual experiences of children raised where the components of these visual patterns are common (the typical WIERD household).  Yet a child in some African environments can go their entire life without ever seeing a right angle, or relations of isosceles and acute angles in their visual field.  Or in less extreme cases where Western features are relatively rare, not absent, relatively few.  Their “visual furniture”—both natural and man-made—is composed of quite different elements.  So naturally these kids will suck at the Raven Matrices, which requires decoding ‘logics’ and patterns composed of these entirely or mostly non-experienced elements.  Their visual learning has occurred with entirely or quite different different inputs.  By this reasoning, visual learning, then, not innate intelligence, explains the 60-ish mean IQ of these Africans (the Mbuti, or the Masai, the San peoples, for instance).

One would think a measurement that says half a population is functionally retarded and incapable of unsupervised work, with half again by DSM standards incapable of self-care, would throw up red flag, one obvious enough to find an alternative explanation than low innate intelligence for these scores.  But heck, no go.  And these guys are disinterested scientists just trying to get at the realities of race and intelligence…?!

 

[ Edited: 10 January 2019 16:32 by TheAnal_lyticPhilosopher]
 
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11 January 2019 01:15
 
TheAnal_lyticPhilosopher - 10 January 2019 04:09 PM

C’mon burt, don’t bite again.  This guy is the Donald Trump of those with intellectual pretenses.  Trump denies that conversation is even nominally about the truth; to that end he just makes up as he goes whatever he needs to in order to get the result he wants.  Speakpigeon denies that what he says carries any implications beyond the ones he wants; to that end he just denies as he goes that he’s even said the basis of any unwanted implications.  The parallel is equally fascinating and horrifying, and it’s a relief to be ignored by him.  So c’mon, burt, join the Dark Side.  Come to ignore and be ignored!!  Don’t fall for it!  Don’t reply!  You’ll thank me for it later….

Are there cookies?

 
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11 January 2019 04:33
 
burt - 11 January 2019 01:15 AM
TheAnal_lyticPhilosopher - 10 January 2019 04:09 PM

C’mon burt, don’t bite again.  This guy is the Donald Trump of those with intellectual pretenses.  Trump denies that conversation is even nominally about the truth; to that end he just makes up as he goes whatever he needs to in order to get the result he wants.  Speakpigeon denies that what he says carries any implications beyond the ones he wants; to that end he just denies as he goes that he’s even said the basis of any unwanted implications.  The parallel is equally fascinating and horrifying, and it’s a relief to be ignored by him.  So c’mon, burt, join the Dark Side.  Come to ignore and be ignored!!  Don’t fall for it!  Don’t reply!  You’ll thank me for it later….

Are there cookies?

What do you think brought Vader?

 
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11 January 2019 05:02
 
TheAnal_lyticPhilosopher - 10 January 2019 04:09 PM

C’mon burt, don’t bite again.  This guy is the Donald Trump of those with intellectual pretenses.  Trump denies that conversation is even nominally about the truth; to that end he just makes up as he goes whatever he needs to in order to get the result he wants.  Speakpigeon denies that what he says carries any implications beyond the ones he wants; to that end he just denies as he goes that he’s even said the basis of any unwanted implications.  The parallel is equally fascinating and horrifying, and it’s a relief to be ignored by him.  So c’mon, burt, join the Dark Side.  Come to ignore and be ignored!!  Don’t fall for it!  Don’t reply!  You’ll thank me for it later….

As he himself says “it would be futile to argue anything else.”

1. Even with sight, we need to learn to see. This is explicitly shown with individuals who have been blind from birth and through medical intervention gain sight.
2. Applying this to logic, one can see the expression of a logical formula, but needs to have learned to see it. Expecting the ground outside to be wet when seeing rain already involves layers of learning.

Tying this in to what else you’ve noted about culture, environment, leaning, IQ, and race…

When the “race realists” did their IQ testing on African kids, they mostly relied on the Raven Matrices subcomponent because of the language barriers to standard IQ tests.  Their reasoning was this subcomponent most strongly correlates with g, their fixed latent factor of general intelligence.  The problem with this: the Raven Matrices are geometrically designed visual tests with ‘logical’ patterns to be detected.  These patterns mainly rely on various orientations and figures with right, acute and isosceles angles—basic elements very reflective of the basic visual elements of the room I am writing from now, and in general reflective of the visual experiences of children raised where the components of these visual patterns are common (the typical WIERD household).  Yet a child in some African environments can go their entire life without ever seeing a right angle, or relations of isosceles and acute angles in their visual field.  Or in less extreme cases where Western features are relatively rare, not absent, relatively few.  Their “visual furniture”—both natural and man-made—is composed of quite different elements.  So naturally these kids will suck at the Raven Matrices, which requires decoding ‘logics’ and patterns composed of these entirely or mostly non-experienced elements.  Their visual learning has occurred with entirely or quite different different inputs.  By this reasoning, visual learning, then, not innate intelligence, explains the 60-ish mean IQ of these Africans (the Mbuti, or the Masai, the San peoples, for instance).

One would think a measurement that says half a population is functionally retarded and incapable of unsupervised work, with half again by DSM standards incapable of self-care, would throw up red flag, one obvious enough to find an alternative explanation than low innate intelligence for these scores.  But heck, no go.  And these guys are disinterested scientists just trying to get at the realities of race and intelligence…?!

Ah, good, I have to feel exhilarated by your inability to stop talking about this hideously awful Trump/Speakpigeon guy. Not that you would want to actually support by rational argument what you nonetheless feel god-justified to claim about him. Sounds like a no-no to me, but there you certainly go. Aw, well, too bad.
Just to make sure you understand, here is one:

TheAnal_lyticPhilosopher - 10 January 2019 04:09 PM

Speakpigeon denies that what he says carries any implications beyond the ones he wants; to that end he just denies as he goes that he’s even said the basis of any unwanted implications.

So, go on, provide the relevant quotes to support your claim here.
Obviously, what I say is interpreted and has to be interpreted to make sense to begin with. However, what I says doesn’t necessarily carry the implications your interpretation suggests to you that it does. Interpretations can be good and can be bad. So, if you think what I say carries certain implications you deem bad, you still have to justify your interpretation, and certainly you have to confront your interpretation to what I have said and what I claim I wanted to convey. And sorry if that feels to you much too awfully logical a thing to hear.

You are content to snipe from the sidelines. You make comments on what I say without actually quoting the relevant part of what I say, indeed without quoting me at all. You know, that’s just bad. You can’t get yourself to practice the minimum required to have a rational conversation, let alone a debate. That’s intellectually deficient. You try to pass off as a working, experienced, knowledgeable intellectual, and may be you are, but here you much, much more obviously behave exactly like this comic character Trump you seem nonetheless to despise. That should be worrying to you and you should be ashamed of yourself, but, hey, if you feel good about yourself, who is this Trump/Speakpigeon cartoon character to try and stop you feeling good about yourself.
Still, I am definitely enjoying myself talking to you, if not quite with you. You are a really good a caricature of bad faith and fighting the bad guys can only feel good. I don’t have a punching-ball at home, so thanks for being this very lame bad guy I can score easy points against.
EB

[ Edited: 11 January 2019 05:05 by Speakpigeon]
 
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11 January 2019 06:04
 
burt - 10 January 2019 04:04 PM

As for knowledge of logical intuition, mathematical intuition, and formal logic I’ve studied these for 40+ years—I do know what I’m talking about. And if you’d read some of my earlier posts with understanding you would see that what I say is not the same as you believe it to be.

You would have to quote the relevant bit of what I said about what you said. I didn’t comment on your “earlier posts” and I’m not going to read your production to sort out what you are trying to say now. You just have to try your best English to convey what you mean clearly.

burt - 10 January 2019 04:04 PM

What you are referring to as “intuitive sense of logic” is what I described in a much earlier post as something far more basic,

No, it isn’t. My notion of intuitive sense of logic isn’t your notion of fit.. It’s not the same thing at all. Your prose is chock-full of half-digested interpretations. Please, stick to the facts of what I said if you want to comment on what I said.
If you want to talk about your notion of fit, just start your own thread about it and see who is interested. But don’t hijack this thread to smuggle in your pet theory.

burt - 10 January 2019 04:04 PM

an intuition of fit—a feeling that something fits (in a given context) or does not.

Good, we all agree we have intuitions and that they can be meaningfully describe as an impression of fit. There, happy? How was it for you? Because for me it was bad. Your notion of fit doesn’t explain our sense of logic. I have read what you said, and you don’t actually explain that. All you do is explain how this sense of fit ties up with our intuitions about things we’ve learnt, like indeed we may learn formal logic. So, yet again, I’m not talking about formal logic. It seems you don’t quite understand my very bad French-kind of English.

burt - 10 January 2019 04:04 PM

But what’s important is the context, without that there is no way to sense a fit or not, and in every case one must learn how to interpret what is given. That’s why I posted the link on the difference of sense and perception. That applies to all forms of thought: a musician must recognize whether a particular not or musical phrase “fits” into a composition; in seeing, the brain must correlate visual input (the sensed part) into patterns of objects (the perception part); a person living in a magical culture will find different and what to us seem illogical connections, but the same feeling of a fit will be there.

Yeah, I got all that straight away. You are repeating yourself. This is something we all understand. So, no need to repeat it again and again.
Now, the crucial point you are missing here is that this doesn’t explain why there couldn’t be an intuitive sense of logic as we have a visual sense, which is essentially intuitive or a nociception sense, which is also intuitive. All it shows, oops, all it suggest to you is that we can interpret the facts of our intuitions by assuming our brain integrates what we learn. Big news! I’m impressed. Well, yeah, but I think I already explained that in one of my posts here. So, no need to echo my words.
Anything else?

burt - 10 January 2019 04:04 PM

You seem caught up in the computational view of mind with the brain as a logical processor, although since you want to treat logic beyond Boolean and propositional calculus, it’s hard to say what you actually mean. For me the brain and mind are not primarily logical processors, rather they function on pattern recognition, pattern matching, and pattern completion processes, not computational ones (I can dig up a quote from von Neumann to that effect if you wish). So the intuitions underlying even logical thought are all intuitions of fitting between different patterns.

Again, I didn’t say or even suggest that the brain works using formal logic. I said explicitly that logic is a good model for how the brain works just like the laws of nature invented by scientists are good models of what nature does. I also said that we may be able to describe and predict the processes of the brain, starting from perhaps groups of neurons, using formal logic, just as we can usefully use Boolean Algebra to describe and predict the processes of computers, which are themselves definitely not formal logic machines, not machines somehow made of formal logic processes, but instead are physical objects, made of electronics, electromagnetic fields, electric charges etc. that we can nonetheless usefully describe using the logical language of Boolean Algebra. I already explained that, so I guess it may be beyond your wits to understand. You could still ask the stooge that follows you around here what to make of it.
And yes, computers, too, have to have a mechanism by which inputs fit. I guess you could say that of the whole of nature. Show me something that exists in nature and yet doesn’t fit with the rest of it?
So, again, all you say here is irrelevant to my point.
And I made a point earlier about my own logical intuitions. You’ve dismissed that as “unreliable evidence” or some such. Well, end of conversation.

Still, it’s not unreliable. I can test it reliably again and again every morning while having a cup of coffee or shaving. So, let me repeat. I have now four different formulas that were entirely new to me when I first had an intuition about them. I never encountered any of them in the literature (most formulas in it are all really very simple). They are also way too complicated for me to analyse them in a formal way as you can decipher a complex statement, or indeed a whole book, in a language you know. It’s been more than two years now since I discovered the first two. I can only now barely produce a formal analysis that may be an explanation as to why these formulas are true. So, your interpretation of our intuitions in terms of what we’ve learnt prior to it just doesn’t apply here. Oops! Sorry, it just doesn’t “fit”.

I understand perfectly what you say here since it’s been the received opinion for a very long time now but the empirical facts I now know just disprove this interpretation.

Still, I guess my point was to see what people thought about this. I guess I now know. Thanks for your contribution.
EB

 

[ Edited: 11 January 2019 06:19 by Speakpigeon]
 
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11 January 2019 10:26
 
Speakpigeon - 11 January 2019 06:04 AM

So, let me repeat. I have now four different formulas that were entirely new to me when I first had an intuition about them. I never encountered any of them in the literature (most formulas in it are all really very simple). They are also way too complicated for me to analyse them in a formal way as you can decipher a complex statement, or indeed a whole book, in a language you know. It’s been more than two years now since I discovered the first two. I can only now barely produce a formal analysis that may be an explanation as to why these formulas are true. So, your interpretation of our intuitions in terms of what we’ve learnt prior to it just doesn’t apply here. Oops! Sorry, it just doesn’t “fit”.

I understand perfectly what you say here since it’s been the received opinion for a very long time now but the empirical facts I now know just disprove this interpretation.

Still, I guess my point was to see what people thought about this. I guess I now know. Thanks for your contribution.
EB

 

And you have grown so attached to your “for formulas” that you fail to understand what people have been telling you here, you shut your ears and chant ‘“I can’t hear you.” Got news for you—INTUITIONS CAN BE WRONG. And your so called formulas are just that: wrong. Thank you for showing how egos function.

 
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12 January 2019 04:55
 
burt - 11 January 2019 10:26 AM

And you have grown so attached to your “for formulas” that you fail to understand what people have been telling you here,

There’s no “for formulas” in my post. Again, if you cared to have a sensible discussion, you would quote the relevant part.
As it is, you’re not up to having any rational conversation on this, at least with me. I suspect, as suggested by the tantrum that you posted a few days ago, now suppressed, that you’re a bit too emotional to have any serious debate. A nice conversation with nice people, but no serious debate.

burt - 11 January 2019 10:26 AM

you shut your ears and chant ‘“I can’t hear you.”

Funny. I’m the one quoting your posts and replying point by point and yet I’m the one shutting my ears?! Whoa.

burt - 11 January 2019 10:26 AM

Got news for you—INTUITIONS CAN BE WRONG.


Absolutely, which is why I say that logic and mathematics are empirical sciences. You observe whatever there is to observe and, yes, possibly, you can make mistakes. No big deal.
This is also the case for all empirical sciences. Newton worked on the basis of Kepler’s laws of planetary motions he himself worked out on the basis of Tycho Brahe’s observations of the movement of planets in the sky. While very accurate for the time, they were not accurate enough to work out the model Einstein later came up with. So, Newton’s laws were effectively wrong from the start. No big deal.
This shows being wrong is not fatal. You just try to improve your observations and your theoretical models.
I’m sorry this well-known history of science should be news to you. I think I first read about it I was a teenager and it was a long while ago if I remember correctly (yeah, I know, we never know for sure).

burt - 11 January 2019 10:26 AM

And your so called formulas are just that: wrong.

Well, you certainly don’t know that. You don’t even know what they are. You in effect claiming they are wrong because you think they conflict, oops, sorry, because you think they don’t fit with your “view” of the world. Yeah, that has to feel real bad.

burt - 11 January 2019 10:26 AM

Thank you for showing how egos function.

Whoa. That qualifies as the Freudian slip of the century.

Fit
2. A sudden outburst of emotion: a fit of jealousy.

Anyway, I guess were’re done here. I certainly know now what I wanted to know.
Nothing about egos, though, I’m sure I already knew that.
EB

[ Edited: 12 January 2019 04:58 by Speakpigeon]
 
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12 January 2019 06:21
 
Speakpigeon - 12 January 2019 04:55 AM

I suspect, as suggested by the tantrum that you posted a few days ago, now suppressed, that you’re a bit too emotional to have any serious debate.

That post was re-located to The Klein Bottle.  And away from The Halls of Critical Thinking.  The tone of a few should not reflect the colour of the many.  Please carry on. 

https://forum.samharris.org/forum/viewthread/68294/P1590

 
 
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